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ABSTRACT 
 Human capital management is a complex and often misunderstood concept for 
today’s military organization, which requires planning for accession, talent competition 
and cost controls within a dynamic environment. Throughout history, the manpower 
required to maintain a standing military during peacetime has always been subject to a 
combination of the external and internal effects of competing interests over budgetary 
concerns and the military requirement to support national strategy. Management science 
has shown how to design and implement the most effective policies, but in today’s 
dynamic environment containing emerging threats and economic opportunity, military 
manpower struggles to meet strategic goals. This thesis fills a gap in the literature by 
examining human capital management from a warfare design perspective, with a systems 
approach interplay to address specific resource constraints and courses of action. 
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A. THE PROBLEM 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) have asked all Department of Defense branches to rethink how they organize, train, 
and equip their forces to prepare for next-generation warfare. This approach means the 
services need to grow their force to meet the demand signal in the national guidance.1 In 
addition, the militaries must win wars. So, it is not enough to simply have the people. The 
people filling the military’s ranks will have to be the best. This qualitative condition 
inherent in warfighting complicates what may initially seem like a simple quantitative 
problem. Making matters worse, the Air Force intends to draw upon its pilots to fill 
manning vacancies in the newly established Space Force. Recruiting and retaining human 
capital is now the primary concern for a Service asked to increase highly technical and 
marketable manning numbers.  
The 2011 withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq and the steady reduction of troops 
from Afghanistan have led to the rapid depletion of those with direct combat experience 
throughout the ranks of the U.S. military.2 Faced with great power competition and 
growing fiscal constraints exacerbated by an additional publicly held federal budget deficit 
approaching $2T, military service chiefs have said they are in a war for talent.3 This talent 
search represents a national security concern that may limit the services’ ability to provide 
sufficient inducements to sustain an all-volunteer force at a time when the number of 
eligible recruits has been trending downward. The military needs to retain its top talent 
 
1 Paul Larson, “The Power of Numbers: Challenges of Rapidly Expanding the Army,” War Room - 
U.S. Army War College (blog), February 13, 2019, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/the-power-
of-numbers/. 
2 Jeff Schogol, “Where Have All the Combat Vets Gone?,” Marine Corps Times, September 13, 2018, 
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2017/08/14/where-have-all-the-combat-vets-gone/. 
3 Christopher Woody, “The Military’s ‘war for Talent’ Is Affecting What the Navy’s Future Ships 
Will Look like - We Are The Mighty,” April 2020, https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-trending/
talent-affecting-navy-future-ships/. 
2 
while growing a lethal and ready force of highly qualified professionals to deter an 
adversary’s threat.4 
For Air Force, this problem is especially pertinent. In the past, Air Force leaders 
have been accused of recruiting pilots and encouraging their retention while requiring them 
to perform an increasingly large number of collateral duties that prevent them from flying.5 
Administrative duties aside, many other factors influence a pilot’s decision to leave the Air 
Force. The assignment selection process, long deployment rotations, and remote duty 
stations appear to be primary reasons pilots leave the military for commercial prospects. 
Recruiting and retaining human capital is now a primary concern for a Service asked to 
increase manning numbers in a highly technical and financially profitable career field. Add 
to that the 30,000 civilian pilots expected to retire over the next ten years, and the 
attractiveness of the civilian market makes the pilot shortage worse.6 
This thesis explores warfare-centric human capital management from a strategic 
design perspective. It employs system dynamics modeling to analyze how the Air Force 
can achieve an end strength of 21,000 pilots by 2030.7 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since the republic’s founding, a general distrust of standing militaries has driven 
America’s civilian population to supply troops for the country’s primary defense.8 This 
 
4 Hugh Harsono, “Losing the Strategic ‘Battle’ AAgainst the PRC (But Not The ‘War’): Part II –
Talent Management,” War Room - U.S. Army War College (blog), June 2020, 
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/talent-management-pt2/. 
5 Taylor, Moore, and Roll, “The Air Force Pilot Shortage,” 3–7. 
6 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Report to Congressional 




7 The Air Force has determined it needs approximately 12,800 pilots, 3,800 Air National Guard pilots, 
and 3,600 reserve pilots. In addition to manned aircraft pilots, the service also requires 4,500 combat 
system officers, 2,000 battle managers, 3,300 RPA pilots, and 15,000 enlisted airmen to make the entire 
system work.  
8 James Carafano, “The Draft Should Be Left Out in the Cold,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed 
March 11, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-draft-should-be-left-out-the-cold. 
3 
opposition to a large military led the U.S. to call up forces when needed and then disband 
these forces when the nation was not at war. A combination of volunteers and conscripts 
had filled the forces’ ranks when manning for strategic defense requirements fell short. In 
1973, the U.S. underwent a seismic shift by abandoning its conscription policy in favor of 
an all-volunteer force (AVF). 
The decision to change from conscription to the military’s current system of 
volunteers reflected the American public’s disapproval of warfighting activities from 1950 
to 1973. Rostker’s research highlighted the challenges in moving the government from 
conscription to the military’s current system of volunteers. The key to the policy change 
was that America’s foreign policy interests were influenced by public disapproval of 
warfighting activity over the previous 23 years.9 Today, the American public appears to be 
just as war-weary as it was when it transitioned to the AVF in 1973.10  
Diverging from a build-up/draw-down pattern, the military’s transition from 
conscription to an AVF created a large-standing force with significant costs associated with 
providing benefits and allowances. What was once a conscription force of unmarried 18-
year-old males became a population of mature professionals, many of whom had 
families.11 In addition, the demography of the force changed dramatically after the Cold 
War. This demographic shift created a perpetual competition for talent between the military 
and private enterprises.12 Military service became one career choice among many afforded 
by the American economy and now subject to the same forces and economic trends that 
affected businesses and corporations. 
 
9 Bernard D. Rostker and K. C. Yeh, I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa 
Monica, UNITED STATES: RAND Corporation, The, 2006), 2.  
10 Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. Veterans, Public Say the Wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan Were Not Worth Fighting” (Pew Research Center, July 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-were-not-
worth-fighting/. 
11 Lawrence J. Korb and David R. Segal, “Manning & Financing the Twenty-First-Century All-
Volunteer Force,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2011, https://www.amacad.org/publication/
manning-financing-twenty-first-century-all-volunteer-force. 
12 Korb and Segal. 
4 
As economic trends have shaped strategic business management in the private 
sector, governments and their militaries have responded to these trends in kind. The U.S. 
government has significantly changed recruiting and retention policies, including career 
opportunities, education, and pay and benefits, to keep military service compensation 
competitive with the civilian job market. Additionally, just as American businesses have 
relied heavily upon technology to grow and compete, so has the military. Modern combat 
today involves a blend of advanced communication systems, precision-guided munitions, 
unmanned vehicles, artificial intelligence, and next-generation weapon systems and 
platforms (to include fighter aircraft). The same basic knowledge and skills required to 
operate these weapons systems are also highly prized by civilian employers. Private 
enterprises have long sought employees with backgrounds in mathematics, science, and 
engineering in competition with military manpower interests.13 
America now has its smallest military force since the Vietnam War.14 This force is 
produced from a diminishing eligible population of citizens.15 The Army has identified 
that approximately 70 percent of the military-aged population do not qualify for military 
service based on health, education, and physical fitness factors.16 As a result, the Navy,17 
Marine Corps,18 and Air Force19 have experienced their own recruiting difficulties. 
Research has long shown that military recruiting capability is directly linked to the U.S. 
 
13 Cindy Williams, Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military System (The MIT Press, 2004), 
2–6. 
14 Amanda Barroso, “The Changing Profile of the U.S. Military: Smaller in Size, More Diverse, More 
Women in Leadership,” Pew Research Center (blog), September 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/09/10/the-changing-profile-of-the-u-s-military/. 
15 Barroso, “The Changing Profile of the U.S. Military.”  
16 Nolan Feeney, “Pentagon: 7 in 10 Youths Would Fail to Qualify for Military Service,” Time, June 
2014, https://time.com/2938158/youth-fail-to-qualify-military-service/. 
17 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Recruiting Could See Changes Following Diversity Listening 
Sessions,” USNI News (blog), April 7, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/07/navy-recruiting-could-see-
changes-following-diversity-listening-sessions. 
18 Lolita C. Baldor, “Military Recruiting Struggles Amid COVID-19 Crisis | RealClearDefense,” April 
6, 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/06/military_recruiting_struggles_amid_covid-
19_crisis_115175-full.html. 
19 Stephen Losey, “Air Force Aims to Modernize Recruiting amid Growing Challenges,” Air Force 
Times, November 2, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/11/02/air-force-aims-
to-modernize-recruiting-amid-growing-challenges/. 
5 
unemployment rate. Bicksler and Nolan, for example, identified that a 10 percent decrease 
in the unemployment rate would reduce the rate of “high-quality” enlisted recruits by 2–4 
percent.20 Although the authors could not establish a positive correlation for recruiting 
when the unemployment rate increases, they identified a downward trend in the quality of 
enlisted recruits across all services.21 
This topic’s relevance continues even as strategic priorities have changed. Since 
2001, the continuing Global War on Terrorism and the emergence of new strategic 
competition from Russia and China have prompted demands for America’s military to 
grow its conventional force. The 2017 NSS22 and the 2018 NDS23 have led all Department 
of Defense branches to rethink how they organize, man, train, and equip their forces to 
prepare for next-generation warfare. This thesis draws on previous research in the 
following interrelated areas: strategic human capital management, strategic competition, 
force, structure, and system dynamics.  
1. Strategic Competition 
This research’s primary impetus is the need to provide national security in the face 
of growing strategic competition. The effects of globalization in the late 1970s and the 
subsequent development of innovations in micro-processing, mobile phones, the internet, 
social media platforms, online trading, and various other technologies have brought 
markets into more direct competition. Horowitz et al. describe “macro changes” in 
advanced technology that have had a dynamic effect on the balance of power and have 
resulted in a “new era” of strategic competition.24 Specifically, their work draws attention 
 
20 Barbara A. Bicksler and Lisa G. Nolan, “Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force: The Need for 
Sustained Investment in Recruiting Resources-An Update” (Arlington, VA: Institute for Strategic Analysis, 
2009),1-3.  
21 Bicksler and Nolan, 2. 
22 Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy (NSS)” (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 20–
21, 28. 
23 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, 
14. 
24 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International 
Politics, Course Book (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1515/
9781400835102. 
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to next-generation weapons systems and identifies trends in education and other human 
skills that machines cannot yet reproduce.25 
In addition to the effects of technology, many scholars believe strategic competition 
from Russia and China will shape future U.S. military force structure policy.26 As 
suggested by Christensen, the future conflict will be different than wars we have fought in 
the past and those we are fighting now. A new type of competition is afoot, one for which 
the U.S. may not be entirely prepared.27 Further, McFate identifies systemic challenges 
that have shaped worldwide volatility and redefined strategic competition. McFate refers 
to this as “durable disorder” and asserts that it is the defining characteristic of the coming 
age of warfare.28 He blames U.S. strategic atrophy as the primary contributing factor for 
the failure to understand these “new rules” of war and claims strategic education begins 
too late in the careers of military servicemembers and is practically nonexistent in civilian 
institutions.29 McFate views these issues as elements in a complex system and concludes 
his work by calling on the U.S. to develop strategic thinkers who can fundamentally reform 
force structure.30  
2. Current Force Structure 
While there is much academic research focused on the general military force 
structure,31 various government organizations and Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers (FFRDCs) publish periodic policy and budget analyses on the 
subject. Among the most authoritative is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In 2016, 
 
25 Michael C Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” July 2018, 
27. 
26 Mark Gunzinger, “Shaping America’s Future Military Toward a New Force Planning Construct,” 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, 68, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
CSBA_ForceStructure-Report-web.pdf, 35–7. 
27 Christensen, 33–5. 
28 Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: How America Can Win- against Russia, China and Other 
Threats (New York, NY: William Morrow, an Imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2020), 5. 
29 McFate, 235. 
30 McFate, 37. 
31 Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, “The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: 
A Primer,” July 2016, 1. 
7 
the CBO published The Military’s Force Structure: A Primer to offer insight into the 
DOD’s operating and sustainment activities and supporting budget allocations. This report 
includes organizational-level personnel data and associated costs.  
In addition to the CBO, the RAND Corporation (RAND) has offered insight into 
“longitudinal trends” in U.S. military force structure and standing military force 
“traditions.” Lewis addressed how the strategic environment influenced these trends and 
traditions,32 and his work captures the complex relationship between the history of the U.S. 
security environment and force structure. Furthermore, RAND’s recent four-part series 
entitled, Evolution of Military Policy provides insight into the historical and future design 
of military force structure. It raises interesting questions about defense manpower policy 
and challenges traditional thought behind maintaining a large, standing military.33 
It explains that while force structure is shaped by the Executive Branch’s national 
security objectives, the employment of force to meet these objectives is subject to 
congressional debate structure.34 
3. Human Capital and System Dynamics  
Human capital is defined as the useful skills and knowledge people acquire as part 
of their participation in economic and labor activities.35 Schultz claimed that much of what 
we currently view as expenses, such as education, healthcare, and even leisure, are direct 
investments in a population’s human capital36 that can improve production, thereby 
increasing national economic wealth. In the spirit of Schultz’s research, the Air Force could 
make the case that it already views its service members as a form of human capital. It offers 
extensive technical training, a wide array of academic programs, competitive pay, 
healthcare, and vacation compensation to more than 350,000 members. Yet, despite these 
 
32 Kevin N. Lewis, “Historical U.S. Force Structure Trends: A Primer,” January 1, 1989, 2.  
33 Gian Gentile, Michael E. Linick, and Michael Shurkin, “The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from 
the Constitution to the Present,” May 4, 2017, 4.  
34 Gentile, Linick, and Shurkin, v–vii. 
35 Theodore William Schultz, Investment in Human Capital; the Role of Education and of Research 
(New York: Free Press, 1970), 3. 
36 Schultz, 3. 
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investments, and the size of the population, the Air Force manning system has experienced 
a decades-old pilot shortfall. The persistence of this manning shortage suggests current 
policies are only addressing part of a much larger system. Perhaps thinking about the pilot 
manning problem from a systems perspective could lend some insight. 
Meadows has claimed that ever since the Industrial Revolution, American 
institutions have relied on a scientific approach, albeit largely reductionist in nature, to 
govern, manage, and educate.37 This approach to problem-solving typically eschews 
holistic views, which embrace system structures as the source of their own problems. 
System dynamics is a modeling approach to problem-solving that accounts for dynamic 
behaviors often found in system structures.38 In 1961, Forrester claimed that social systems 
are significantly harder to understand and influence than physical systems. He 
demonstrated how modeling could improve the understanding of structures and the 
resulting dynamic properties of a system. Systems, he explained, “consist of interconnected 
variables, feedback loops, and associated time delays leading to nonlinearities that result 
in dynamic behaviors over time.”39 Perhaps by integrating the human capital views from 
Schultz and system dynamics from Forrester, the Air Force can better understand and 
effectively address their pilot manning problems. 
C. RESEARCH GAP – HCM AND MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE 
Over the last 120 years, the perception of managing people has transformed from 
an onerous chore, often considered a harsh reality of conducting business, to one of new 
value creation within the business enterprise. Taylor described management as a science 
capable of creating value through conservation and efficiency. He believed management 
science contained its own “laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation.”40 Fayol described 
 
37 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, Vt: Chelsea Green 
Pub, 2008), 4. 
38 Jay Wright Forrester, Principles of Systems, 2nd prel. ed. (Wright-Allen Press, 1971), 3. 
39 Forrester, Principles of Systems, 2–3. 
40 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York (State): Harper & 
Brothers, 1911), 7. 
9 
management as the interaction of “value creation and administration.”41 Additionally, 
Fayol wrote that only “close collaboration” with science could prepare organizations for 
the uncertainty found in their respective strategic environments. Together, these early 
definitions represent something exciting within management science: the concept of 
recognizing organized value creation in the context of a strategic environment.  
Subsequently, as strategic environments have changed over time, the language used 
to describe management practice has also changed. Taylor and Fayol’s “personnel 
management” of the 1920s grew into “human resource management” during the rapid 
globalization of the 1970s.42 In 1971, economist Theodore Schultz conceptualized human 
capital as “all human abilities either innate or acquired” in his seminal work Investment in 
Human Capital.43 In 1999, Bontis and his fellow researchers provided the following 
description of human capital: 
Human capital represents the human factor in the organization; the 
combined intelligence, skills, and expertise that gives the organization its 
distinctive character. The organization’s human elements are capable of 
learning, changing, innovating, and providing the creative thrust that if 
properly motivated can ensure the organization’s long-term survival.44 
In 2002, Scarborough and Elias continued Schultz’s and Bontis’ work and 
described human capital management (HCM) as a “bridging concept” that illustrates the 
connection between human resources management and strategic management.45 Today, 
nearly 20 years later, their description still applies. While academic definitions serve as a 
starting point for understanding concepts, military organizations must take these concepts 
and translate them into processes to build military organizations. 
 
41 Armand Hatchuel and Blanche Segrestin, “A Century Old and Still Visionary: Fayol’s Innovative 
Theory of Management,” European Management Review 16, no. 2 (Summer 2019), 399–412.  
42 Morgen Witzel, A History of Management Thought (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; Routledge, 
2011), 140–144. 
43 Schultz, 5. 
44 Nick Bontis et al., “The Knowledge Toolbox:: A Review of the Tools Available to Measure and 
Manage Intangible Resources,” European Management Journal 17, no. 4 (1999): 391. 
45 Angela Baron and Michael Armstrong, Human Capital Management: Achieving Added Value 
Through People (Kogan Page Publishers, 2007), 2. 
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Within the DOD, the three military services have interpreted human capital 
management differently according to their understandings of the concept.46 HCM in the 
business arena is called Total Force Management (TFM) in the military. Subsequently, as 
each department is responsible for their force planning, force structuring, and force 
development functions, they also have unique processes related to these functions. These 
processes are designed to recruit, organize, train, and equip the services to accomplish 
specific security objectives, but each service’s process is unique. The Army describes force 
management as “an all-inclusive term for determining force requirements, allocating 
resources, and assessing the utilization of the resources.”47 The Navy describes it as “both 
a process and a system that converts national military strategy into personnel readiness.”48 
In the Air Force, the term force management refers to “the entire life cycle of personnel” 
and includes “accession through retirement including readiness growth, development, and 
deployment.”49 These distinct differences between each service’s description of human 
resources highlight the lack of a unifying perspective among the departments, even though 
they all have the same economic, career, education, and health factors affecting their 
human resources.  
Additionally, while each service maintains its respective systems and processes for 
recruiting, accession and retention, leadership has issued very little, if any, public-facing 
strategic human capital guidance for their respective Services and chains of command. This 
point was identified in a 2001 GAO report, highlighting four areas in which military 
organizations have demonstrated significant performance gaps. They are as follows: 
“leadership, strategic human capital planning, retaining talent, and a results-oriented 
 
46 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Misses New Pilot Goal Again as Service Pushes to Revolutionize 
Training,” Military.com, February 18, 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/18/air-force-
misses-new-pilot-goal-again-service-pushes-revolutionize-training.html. 
47 U.S. Army War College, 2015–2016 How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 
2016, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3283.pdf, 18–24. 
48 Naval Support Activity Southern potomac, “Total Force Manpower,” April 2020, 
https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/ndw/installations/nsa_south_potomac/installations/nsf_indian_head/
about/total_force_manpower.html. 
49 Air Force Personnel Center, “About Us,” accessed March 29, 2021, https://www.afpc.af.mil/
About/. 
11 
culture.”50 Additionally, the GAO asserts this lack of understanding is apparent within the 
military’s leadership and management.51 The report was updated in 2019 to show that not 
only were no improvements made over nearly 20 years in response to the previous findings 
but there had also been a further decline in leadership’s commitment to the previously 
identified issues. As a result, the GAO report moved the problem into the “high-risk” 
area.52  
This preliminary research suggests a gap exists between human capital, captured in 
the academic literature, and the perception of human value in the military. As demonstrated 
by the military’s chronic pilot manning problem, there is an apparent inability to fully 
leverage the value of human capital. On the one hand, the academic literature designed for 
private enterprises suggests a long-term focus on the value of human capital for a 
business’s survival. On the other, defense requirements are held in check by fiscal cycles 
of budgetary constraints. This juxtaposition has driven the military to focus on only those 
processes within their short-term control.  
This thesis seeks to address this gap between the value of human capital and 
military budgetary constraints by answering the following research question. By embracing 
a “human capital systems” approach, that incorporates economic and technological trends 
in an evolving strategic environment, how can the Air Force achieve an end-strength of 
21,000 pilots by 2030?  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This Literature Review will cover five academic areas of interest that contributed 
to an understanding and analysis of military force structure and manning shortages in a 
period of great power competition. This work included a review of U.S. military 
manpower, strategic human capital management, human resource management in the 
military, recent and future trends (both in military technology and society and culture), and 
changing mental models with system dynamics.  
A. REVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER 
Millet’s For the Common Defense provided a broad and deep historical overview 
of American wars from the early colonial period to 2012. He discusses the military force 
required to meet security objectives and speaks of the cost of human lives at the end of 
each conflict. Millet’s research is a comprehensive, chronological survey of American 
military history that blends a discussion of strategic decision-making with operational and 
tactical details.  
Gentile et al.’s “The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the 
Present” offers an insightful, four-volume reference that catalogs military and 
congressional decision-making, leading to significant policy changes throughout 
America’s military’s history. The authors’ focus is primarily on Army force structure but 
with clear, general applicability for all services. They assert that the AVF was created due 
to President Lyndon Johnson’s misuse of the draft during the Vietnam war.53 Public 
opposition to the war and subsequent social unrest led to a re-examination of national 
security objectives and the military’s manning policies. The transition to the AVF in 1973 
brought into consideration a synthesis of opinion poll data, national security objectives, 
units required to meet those objectives, and financial data.54 Both Millet and Gentile’s 
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works highlighted the absence of a coherent military policy and how, over time, ideological 
debates and compromises could lead to changes in the force structure.55 
B. STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
Human capital management has its roots in general management science. What 
started with Taylor and Fayol in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as scientific 
approaches to business management became human resource management when 
corporations began employing thousands of people. Witzel explains in a History of 
Management Thought how business managers developed an understanding of their 
workforce as a resource over time, which, when properly managed, could have long-
standing strategic benefits for firms. While the principles of effective management existed 
long before Taylor and Fayol, the strategic implications of human resources were not 
recognized as a source of competitive advantage until the effects of globalization were fully 
realized in the 1970s.56 
Characterized by a “whipsawing” effect that attempted to balance rapid employee 
turnover with high production output, the private sector experienced a crisis during an 
economic recession as post-World War II expansion slowed. Businesses suffered a 
departure of skilled labor as many World War II-era factory workers retired. As America’s 
“greatest generation” exited the labor force, they were replaced by younger workers who 
lacked the previous generation’s experience. This new, largely unskilled labor force 
initially produced substandard goods that simply could not compete with cheaper labor 
markets abroad.57 Deming’s Out of the Crisis became the “gold standard” for total quality 
management (although Deming never explicitly mentioned the term). It linked the quality 
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of goods and services to a range of stakeholders that included managing board members, 
business partners, the labor force, and customers.58 
As human resource management became common business practice, economic 
theories began to influence many corporations.59 With Schultz’s Investment in Human 
Capital: The Role of Education and Research, business managers could now study the 
effects of human capital management on a population-wide scale. The author’s work 
included three main characteristics that fundamentally shaped strategic management. First, 
he showed that countries without sufficient human capital could not manage physical 
(infrastructure) capital. Second, he demonstrated how real economic growth relies on equal 
increases in physical capital and human capital. Lastly, Schultz asserted that human capital 
is the most critical factor in a nation’s economic and private business growth.60 
Similarly, McDonald examined the defense sector’s human capital and its 
relationship to the economy. He describes the “defense-growth” relationship as the 
relationship between defense allocations within the federal budget and the growth of the 
American economy.61 Specifically, McDonald’s research attempted to quantify the human 
capital a military member represents and how the value of that human capital contributes 
to the economy. Covering the years from 1954 to 2014, the author established a dynamic 
equilibrium model with the defense sector as an economic constraint and drew steady-state 
values from the period.62 While many scholars debate how the decades-long Cold War and 
Global War on Terror have affected the American economy, McDonald’s research focused 
primarily on whether the military expense resulted in a net positive effect.63 The findings 
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showed how military force structure and its subsequent human capital input could 
positively and indirectly have a net positive effect. Directly, military skills and training 
offer a net benefit to the economy, and indirectly service members contribute to the DOD’s 
ability to serve the nation.64 Interestingly, a 2002 study by David Loughran indicated that 
most military members who leave the service opt for low-wage, industrial jobs regardless 
of labor market conditions.65 
While McDonald’s research shows a positive correlation between defense spending 
on personnel training and the health of the U.S. economy, this phenomenon is not universal. 
For a strategic competitor, researchers identified a negative correlation between defense 
spending and the economy in China. Zhao, Zhao, and Chen showed how the Chinese 
economy produced an opposite effect when examining defense spending with reductions 
in the Chinese military.66 The study found that it needed to reduce defense allocations for 
China to grow its economy and increase budget spending for public sector education and 
health.67 Although both studies examined defense spending, only McDonald’s work 
focused on human capital investment. Today, the military’s support of national security 
objectives is, as it has been in the past, a balancing act between economics, strategic threats, 
and political policies, whether at home or abroad. Strategic HCM is a process aimed at 
forecasting and balancing present needs with future demands. 
A considerable portion of the academic research related to HCM in the military 
examined the manpower required to execute specific missions. Typically, force structure 
models are built around current or emerging national security threats, with contingency 
plans linked to scenarios or wargaming of potential conflicts. The following section 
describes the most recent studies related to the military’s applications of human resource 
management. 
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C. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE MILITARY 
In 2000, Taylor et al. presented one of the most prominent military studies of human 
resources focused on the aviation community. They suggested that the Air Force had 
recruited and trained an insufficient number of pilots during a decade of force reductions 
from 1990 to 1999.68 The study found that fighter aircraft units experienced a loss rate 
exceeding 70 percent in 1997. Further, 25 percent of experienced pilots who had reached 
15 years of service separated before retirement. Flying units would require 25 percent more 
flying hours, with increased operating and maintenance costs, to compensate for the loss 
of experienced pilots.  
Finally, filling units with new, inexperienced pilots caused fully qualified pilots to 
fly more hours since they were needed to manage and train the inexperienced pilots.69 The 
added hours for fully trained pilots increased their separation rate and required additional 
O&M allocations to cover the additional costs associated with flying more missions.70 The 
study concluded that the Air Force needed to establish an active duty aviation community 
rotation with Guard and Reserve units to compensate for the pilot shortage. Additionally, 
the annual accession of fighter pilots should be limited to 330, of which 30 personnel would 
report to non-active-duty units.71 When the Air Force incorporated the changes 
recommended in the study, they only exacerbated the problem by effectively reducing the 
number of pilots in Field Training Units (FTU), which in turn increased the number of 
hours flown per month by operational units. 
A 2019 study on the relative cost-effectiveness of Air Force pilot retention versus 
accession provided essential background data for the use case presented later in this 
research. Mattock et al. examined costs associated with training and the costs of aviation 
incentives and retention bonuses to determine whether the incentives were high enough to 
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retain pilots in a competitive job market.72 The study concluded that pilots remained in the 
Air Force longer and beyond 20 years of service when the aviation incentives were 
increased to $35,000 per year.73 The study also showed that due to the cost of pilot training, 
which varies from $1.01 million for a C-17 pilot to approximately $10.9 million for an F-
22 pilot, it is more cost-effective to increase career incentives than to increase accessions 
to sustain inventory. Even if training costs could be reduced to $1 million per pilot, a 
$45,000 aviation bonus per year would be required to keep fighter pilots after their initial 
10-year service commitment to compete with future airline hiring demand.74  
However, Mattock’s research has several limitations. One of its limitations is that 
it focused primarily on fighter pilot incentives, even though fighter pilots only comprised 
25 percent of the entire aviation community. Additionally, Mattock’s research examined 
no other options for managing or retaining pilots. These options might have included cross-
training pilots to fly additional aircraft during peacetime, incentivizing inter-service 
transfers, or pursuing enlisted pilot programs. It also fails to address options to reduce the 
cost of training or increase the use of unmanned vehicles to reduce manned fighter pilot 
missions over time. 
D. RECENT AND FUTURE TRENDS 
1. Recent and Future Trends in Military Technology 
In addition to the literature on military force structure and human resources, 
previous research on future military technology offered insight into the technological 
trends that will “likely influence future military operations.”75 Andas’s recent research 
highlighted software and hardware platforms in development by the defense industry. 
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According to Andas, a range of technology designed to improve loiter, monitoring, and 
response times are currently underway. In addition, he forecasts increased use of directed 
energy, hypersonic, and space-based platforms with offensive and defensive capabilities 
and their supporting C2 and C4I infrastructures. Also, Andas anticipates that future 
command infrastructure will incorporate predictive algorithm support for decision-making 
and foresees its increased use over the long term.76 These technologies will include 
advanced robotics, autonomous systems, AI, and augmented reality technologies, which 
Andas predicts will facilitate manned-unmanned teaming to enable a single operator to 
control more than one unmanned vehicle.77 Finally, he contends that such technologies 
will reduce manpower requirements in future warfare environments, although he makes no 
specific predictions of the rate at which technology will displace manpower.  
In addition to Andas’ research, Thornton and Miron’s work suggests the future of 
warfare will be heavily influenced by a new international arms race that AI is expected to 
dominate.78 They assert that while “NATO focuses on how to win battles, Russia focuses 
on how to win wars.”79 The strategic focus on winning future wars has guided the Russian 
military to redesign its approach to warfare completely. This redesign is centered on cyber 
warfare but completely automated through AI.80 
According to the authors, the Russian military is leading the way in AI research and 
development. Evidence supporting Russia’s military commitment to the growth of their AI 
can be seen in the employment of AI-enhanced mine-clearing systems like the Uran-6 and 
Uran-9 mine-clearing and Marker armored fighting vehicles in Syria.81 In addition to the 
ground-based vehicles, Russia has also employed an AI-enhanced drone in the Sukhoi S-
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70 and its air defense and ballistic missile systems.82 Russia has demonstrated an 
unquestionable commitment to advancing this technology in its weapons systems. 
Still, Russia’s strategic commitment to “active defense” is aimed at using political 
and social division as a primary force multiplier. Russia intends to wage AI-enabled 
information and cyber warfare to defeat an adversary, not simply to disrupt or disable a 
network.83 From the Russian perspective, AI can overload the information space with fake 
data in sufficient enough quantities to render the truth impossible to discern. The Russian 
military believes that cognitive warfare would involve a struggle for truth in this 
environment.84 According to Thornton and Miron, the Russians believe such a war can be 
controlled to their advantage by using AI effectively. 
In addition to Russia’s example of the future conduct of cyber warfare, technology 
is driving other changes in military strategy. Directed energy weapons and anti-satellite 
missiles pose a viable, kinetic threat to the U.S. early warning and nuclear command and 
control (C2) satellites. Del Monte’s research indicates that at least one nation may have 
already employed a space-based laser weapon system.85 The author points to the U.S. 
refusal to sign the proposed 2008 Chinese-Russian treaty to prevent the deployment of 
weapons of mass destruction in space as an indicator of potential U.S. capability.86  
However, there is no guarantee that the U.S will be able to maintain a monopoly on 
any offensive or defensive technology or innovation in the future.87 The U.S. is expected 
to be challenged by a four-faced threat from counterterrorism, gray-zone or hybrid warfare, 
asymmetric or unconventional warfare (to include cyber warfare), and high-end 
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conventional warfare with a peer or near-peer.88 These threats suggest the U.S. must invest 
in a variety of technologies and capabilities to “renew its enduring advantages.”89 As the 
strategic environment continues to increase in complexity, domestic political and 
ideological divisions will contribute to competing narratives that further complicate 
America’s ability to effectively respond to a wide array of threats.  
2. Radical Changes in Society and Culture 
In addition to the literature on warfighting trends, changes in the American 
population have contributed to the military’s inability to recruit and retain talented 
personnel. According to a 2018 report by Spoehr and Handy, 71 percent of Americans 
between 17 and 24 are ineligible for military service. The researchers identified four main 
disqualifiers: health problems, physical fitness, education, and criminality.90 Spoehr and 
Handy concluded with a plan that included recommendations for the executive branch, 
Congress, and local government support in finding a solution. But how did the country 
arrive at what Lieutenant General John Bednarek claims is a national security issue?91  
Perhaps research by Janowitz can offer some insight. Janowitz claimed many 
people are uninformed by a larger vision of societal needs. When added to what Janowitz 
calls a “weakening court system,” the distance between “judicial reasoning and popular 
moral beliefs” becomes significant.92 Janowitz concluded by examining social controls 
intended to usher populations into conditions of “higher moral principles.” He believes that 
American culture has always been guided by three essential themes from a sociologist’s 
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perspective: Protestant ideology, personal freedom, and individuality.93 Janowitz’s 
research on political and social constructs offers an elemental awareness of the structural 
reasons why so many Americans are ineligible for military service.  
Similarly, Rosen identified a connection between social structures and strategic 
behaviors as they relate to the military.94 First, Rosen examined how social structures 
affect how members of society treat each other. He discussed the notion that 
servicemembers, after repeated deployments and combat, become separated from the larger 
society psychologically. A government’s ability to staff its military is affected by the 
“dominant social structures of the host society.”95 Rosen claimed the military’s ability to 
perform its institutional functions is undergirded by the larger society, impacting its ability 
to wield offensive and defensive power.96  
Similarly, Alperovitz makes a convincing argument that the social problems 
inherent in America’s economic and political system negatively affect the population writ 
large, which likely has implications for recruitment and retention. Central to Alperovitz’s 
argument is that systemic problems severely affect American society.97 Shifts in the 
American population brought on by changes in demography have impacted American 
political views, and these political views have led to policy changes.98 Moreover, the 
policy changes have been failing Americans in a way that contributes to radical changes in 
education, culture, and ultimately, society. As previously described by Forrester, this 
systemic quality manifests itself in ways that are difficult for people to comprehend and 
even more challenging to solve.  
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A quick update to Alperovitz’s statistics suggests the problems he identified eight 
years ago have only gotten worse. Economically, the top one percent of Americans earned 
10 percent of all income 45 years ago.99 Currently, that group earns 20 percent of all 
income.100 Slow wage growth has left most Americans without the means to achieve a 
decent standard of living.101 Weekly earnings for average Americans have risen 3 percent 
in the last ten years when adjusted for compositional effects of COVID-19.102 Further, 
Hispanics have become the largest ethnic minority group, surpassing African Americans 
by 6 percent in 2019.103  
Moreover, the composition of the American family has changed. When measured 
in 1968, 7 percent of parents were unmarried, compared to 25 percent in 2017.104 Of 
course, not all unmarried parents live in separate homes, but this number does indicate a 
shift in the population’s view of marriage.105 The incarceration rate has increased 
substantially, which has reduced the recruitment pool of military-aged males. For example, 
in 1968, the rate of incarcerated persons in the U.S. was 93 per 100,000; today, that number 
has grown to 655 per 100,000.106 Further, according to Tikkanen and Abrams, among the 
world’s wealthiest nations, the U.S. now ranks among the worst in “inequality, poverty, 
life expectancy, infant mortality, mental health, obesity, public spending as a percentage 
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of GDP, the well-being of children, and overall environmental performance.”107 These 
previously discussed indicators reinforce Alperovtiz’s claim that the issues facing 
Americans today require a systems approach to address. 
Comprehensively, Janowitz, Rosen, and Alperovitz have contributed significantly 
to a central theme of this research: the American population’s ability to support a growing 
military force is impaired. Janowitz claims that the U.S., although wealthy, has inherent 
problems within its societal structures. Rosen identified the link between the societal 
structure and its influence on the military’s ability to perform its core functions. Alperovitz 
identified the need to view these problems from a system’s perspective. The literature 
suggests globalization paired with economic, political, and demographic shifts have likely 
led to a reconsideration of traditional American values and may influence America’s ability 
to govern and staff a military.  
E. CHANGING MENTAL MODELS WITH SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Jay Forrester has often been called the father of System Dynamics.108 In his 
seminal work, Principles of Systems, he established a method for modeling systems.109 
Forrester’s research illustrated how to model a system’s behaviors by using causal loop 
diagrams and feedback to represent the paths for material and information. His work is 
widely referenced as it presents itself within reach of those unfamiliar with computer 
systems modeling by providing easy-to-understand inventory and sales examples. Also, in 
Modeling for Learning Organizations, Forrester expressed his philosophy on system 
dynamics modeling when used for policies, decision-making, and information sources.110 
Further, it included Forrester’s recommendations for more practical education, an idea 
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Forrester attributed to Nancy Roberts.111 In this way, Forrester’s work (and system 
dynamics, generally) contribute to a more robust examination of human capital within the 
management sciences. 
In addition to Forrester, scholars like Churchman and Sterman have made 
substantial contributions to system dynamics and have demonstrated its applicability to 
government policy, including military force structure. A critical aspect of system dynamics 
is that it explicitly accounts for interconnected system elements whose behavior is often 
the result of nonlinear effects. As previously mentioned, many of today’s social, economic, 
and national security issues, including force structure, resulting from a complex system of 
competing interests from stakeholders representing local governments, private 
corporations, and various social interests.112 This context presents decision-makers with 
nonlinear challenges, which are difficult for traditional mental models to capture. In other 
words, traditional scientific approaches that employ an events-driven, reductionist 
approach113 to problem-solving simply will not suffice. 
Churchman provided a practical approach to systems thinking for scientific 
management. He encouraged readers to view complex problems in the context of 
systems.114 Following Churchman’s practical approach to scientific management, 
Sterman’s Business Dynamics contributed methods to move from practical approaches in 
management to specific tools and processes for strategic policy creation. 
System dynamics offers qualitative and quantitative reasoning that can support 
decision-making through increased forecasting of unpredictable outcomes that emerge 
from complex systems. This perspective, and the resulting modeling approach, are helpful 
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for decision-makers because, as Forrester expounds, all decisions are made within feedback 
loops.115 Feedback loops are described by a process beginning with a decision, which 
controls an action. That action, in turn, alters the state of the system, characterized by a 
stock or state variable and its associated net rate of change. These rates of change are 
generally determined by non-linear feedback mechanisms that can be conceptualized by 
cause and effect relationships of independent and dependent variables with loops of system 
behavior. These loops display positive, reinforcing, or negative, balancing, behavior within 
the system.116  
Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of system dynamics is the embodiment of 
“theories of action” captured in single-loop and double-loop learning. Argyris describes 
single-loop learning with an example of a thermostat which “learns” when the current 
temperature is above or below the desired temperature and can turn the system on or off.117 
Double-loop learning allows a second and more fundamental inquiry about the rules and 
policies which govern the system.118 Furthermore, Argyris claims that while organizations 
are good at single-loop learning, it is the underlying management theory that created the 
problem, to begin with, and is symbolic of deficient mental models.119 
In addition to Forrester’s system dynamics foundation and Argyris’ single and 
double-loop learning, Tversky and Kahneman’s research into decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty, the use of heuristics, and associated judgmental biases 
underscore the potential flaws in our mental models. Models based on heuristics, or overly 
simplistic principles, although helpful, harbor biases and often lead to grave errors in 
judgment and policy.120 These errors are caused by cognitive biases that present 
themselves to novices and experts alike and require more advanced methods for 
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understanding system complexities.121 System dynamics offers a methodology to allow 
leaders and managers to gain an enhanced understanding of the non-linearities that play a 
role in complex systems and to then adjust their mental models.  
As Tversky and Kahneman have explained, mental models, based on intuitive 
judgments, are often the result of well-intentioned managers who work in specialized areas 
within the system and unwittingly focus on short-term problems trying to affect long-term 
change.122 But these models often fail to account for nonlinear feedback that can 
counteract newly implemented policies and worsen existing problems. This phenomenon 
was previously captured by Taylor’s “Air Force Pilot Shortage” study. 
  
 
121 Tversky and Kahneman, 9. 
122 Tversky and Kahneman, 14. 
28 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
29 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This work uses an exploratory research methodology that includes system 
dynamics modeling to address a specific human capital concern for the Air Force. The Air 
Force pilot manning system was selected because it is arguably the most expensive military 
community in cost per capita and represents significant value in human capital.123 This 
thesis incorporates strategic, economic, and technological trends with qualitative and 
quantitative data to develop the system dynamics model.  
A brief description of system dynamics modeling, initial conceptualization with 
causal loop diagrams (CLD), and the model construction are included. The model includes 
a dashboard, or user “Interface,” to aid in evaluating the problem over a simulated run of 
30 years and to thereby inform policy and development that could achieve desired pilot 
manning goals. Simulations were run comparing different strategic approaches aimed at 
closing the manning shortfall. Findings are included, along with recommendations for 
further research.  
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IV. USE OF MODELING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As previously discussed in the literature review, system dynamics offers a 
methodology for leaders and managers to model complex systems that are producing 
problematic behavior. This approach can provide insight into the systemic failure of the 
Air Force to meet its pilot manning requirements. Fundamentally, Air Force human capital 
management consists of a complex man, train, and equip system of systems with a variety 
of agents, policies, delays, and resource constraints that provide non-linear feedback 
resulting in non-intuitive and often problematic behavior outcome over an extended time 
horizon.  
A system dynamics model is intended to address an endogenous system that is 
resulting in problematic behavioral outcomes. The model is bounded arbitrarily so that the 
system structure ideally includes only the essential underlying dynamics required to 
identify the source of the problem. System dynamics models use differential equations to 
determine the net rates of change in units per time (referred to as “flows”) for 
accumulations (referred to as “stocks”) of any measurable tangible or intangible units. 
These accumulations represent the state of the system at any given time.124 
Mathematically, flows represent differentiation, and stocks represent integration, and the 
system’s behavior changes as a result of various feedback structures within the system.  
Rate equations are generally non-linear functions of exogenous, constant, and state 
variables that, together with delays, data, and feedback inherent in the system’s structure, 
result in the system’s behavioral outcomes over the course of the simulation’s run. 
Traditionally, system dynamics models are validated by comparing graphs of actual system 
outcomes over a fixed period of time from time t0 to tn to a simulation initiated with actual 
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data at time t0 and run over the same time period t0 to time tn. If the model’s simulated 
outcome is a near enough fit to the actual trend of the system, the model’s structure is 
validated. Often, however, system dynamics modeling is used to evaluate proscribed 
changes in policies intended to produce a more desirable outcome when run over an 
extended time horizon into the future. In this case, the model cannot be thus validated since 
the policies have not yet been implemented, and there are assumptions made regarding 
future conditions. In this case, “validation” of the model’s fit is based largely on subject 
matter expert input into the system’s structure, assumptions, and outcomes.125  
B. CONCEPTUALIZATION 
The first step in using this modeling approach is to develop a causal loop diagram 
(CLD). Independent and dependent variables are connected with arrows to demonstrate a 
relationship. These cause-and-effect relationships are denoted with positive or negative 
polarity. The polarity indicates whether the relationship between an independent and its 
linked dependent variables is positive or negative. Positive feedback reinforces change, 
while negative feedback balances change.126 Positive feedback is similar to a positive 
correlation. When an independent variable increases (or decreases), the corresponding 
dependent variable experiences an increase (or decrease). Negative feedback is much like 
a negative or inverse correlation. When an independent variable increases (or decreases), 
the corresponding dependent variable decreases (or increases). To determine whether a 
loop is balancing or reinforcing, the negative polarity links in the loop are counted. If there 
are no negative links or an even number of negative polarity links, the loop is reinforcing 
and labeled with the loop identifier “R.” If there are an odd number of negative links in the 
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The Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) uses many systems to recruit, assess, train, 
separate, retain, and retire its service members. AFPC works conjointly with Air Education 
and Training Command to identify vacant positions in flying units and select candidates to 
fill them. Air Force managers respond to vacancies within the system by creating a demand 
signal that often results in unintended consequences and costly outcomes over time. In 
addition, manning policies change in response to nearly every manning shortfall since 
Congress adjusts the military end strength through a planning and budgetary process 
annually. The current system uses the United States Air Force Academy and over 200 
Reserve Officer Training Corps units on college campuses as commissioning platforms for 
Air Force officers and pilot candidates, augmented with inter-service transfers from within 
the DOD. After initial officer selection, pilot candidates begin an approximate three-year 
training process involving various personnel actions, including reassignments and 
reclassifications into various specialties. Despite decades of policy changes aimed at 
addressing recurring pilot manning shortfalls, the service has been unable to meet 
fluctuating pilot end-strength requirements. 
The arrows drawn in the CLD in Figure 1 indicate positive and negative “causal 
links” between independent and dependent variables within the Air Force Pilot Manning 
System. Three causal loops within the Air Force’s human resources system are labeled with 
loop identifiers indicating whether the loop’s behavior is reinforcing (R) or balancing (B): 
Manned Pilot Demand; Unmanned Pilot Demand; and, Recruiting. These loops are 
influenced by various recruiting, retention, and separation causal relationships. According 
to the current Air Force management philosophy, after pilots are assigned to their 
operational units, the various aviation communities are assigned management teams based 
on aircraft type/weapon system. For example, once fighter pilots are assigned to a unit, 
they are managed separately from airlift or reconnaissance aircraft pilots. The same 




Figure 1. Air Force Pilot Manning System CLD (All Figures Herein Created 
Using ISEE System Stella Architect) 
C. DATA SOURCES 
The system dynamics model developed for this research was built using only 
publicly available, open-source data as reported by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), 
RAND Corporation (RAND), the GAO, and various defense news outlets. Additionally, 
the model assumes a steady-state retention profile without imposed stop-loss or wartime 
restrictions on recruiting and retention policies. In order to analyze the total impact of 
policy changes over time, the model’s simulation was designed to run for 28 years instead 
of the ten years cited in the research question. Some of these policy changes may only 
produce measurable effects or unforeseen consequences long after the ten-year window to 
achieve the desired manning.  
Manned aircraft pilot manning was initialized to be 10,900, while unmanned 
aircraft pilot manning was initialized at 1,900. These figures were reported for Regular Air 
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Force (RegAF) active-duty pilots in 2018.128 With only publicly available data, the model 
assumed a target goal of 21,000 based on the 2021 fiscal year budget request.129 
Additionally, the model uses the Air Force’s 2019 end strength of 348,000 personnel with 
an associated 18 percent replenishment rate. Officer accessions data was compiled from 
the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the United States Air Force Academy 
(USAFA),130 and the Air Education and Training Command’s (AETC) Officer Training 
School (OTS).131 The GAO reported an average pilot loss rate of 8.78 percent (i.e., eight 
percent of the pilots leave the Air force annually). Additionally, the Air Force reports an 
attrition rate of 15 percent for the unmanned aircraft pilot training pipeline. The service has 
cited a failure to prescreen candidates for training as the cause for an attrition rate three 
times higher than manned aircraft pilot training platform. 
The GAO identified a strong correlation between the civilian unemployment rate 
and “high quality enlisted” recruiting for the armed services.132 Additionally, while it is 
the case that retention declines as the unemployment rate decreases, this correlation appears 
not to be as responsive as recruiting. This response difference between the numbers 
recruited and the numbers retained is likely due to varying delays associated with the net 
flows of each stock: current military members are already employed, and recruits are not. 
Thus, any decreases in the unemployment rate would have a more immediate (reduction) 
effect on the accession of recruits than on the separation of military members with 
contractual service commitments. Based on the strength of this correlation reported by the 
GAO, the model reflects changes in the unemployment rate as it influences recruiting. The 
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model forecasts the future unemployment rate as a normal distribution, assuming 
employment trends over the next 30 years will largely resemble those of the last 30 years. 
Additionally, the global pandemic caused by COVID-19 is reflected in the unemployment 
rate trend, with a peak rate of 14.8 percent in April 2020.133 
The model also assumes that commercial unmanned pilot demand will grow from 
less than 1,000 in 2018 to more than 60,000 by 2036.134 The first unmanned large-body 
platforms are expected to be in service by 2025 in remote areas for specific applications 
such as short-haul cargo and passenger services.135 As time goes by, the commercial 
aviation industry is expected to reduce its reliance on manned pilots to save about $35 
billion per year. This shift in platform use equates to roughly $3 billion in savings for each 
major airline in an industry plagued by extreme competition, regulatory costs, and tight 
operating margins.136 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency recently hosted a competition 
between a human F-16 pilot and an AI computer developed by Heron Systems in a 
simulated dogfight. The AI computer’s simulated aircraft beat the human pilot’s simulated 
aircraft in every single round without the human scoring a single hit on the computer’s 
aircraft. This work by DARPA is part of a long-running effort to increase confidence in 
autonomous systems in dogfighting scenarios that could result in a reduction in reliance on 
human pilots overall. DARPA’s work assumes that over the next 10–15 years, reliance on 
manned aircraft platforms will decrease as unmanned platform use increases. Both an 
increase in commercial unmanned aircraft pilot hiring and DARPA’s forecast of manned-
unmanned platform parity are captured in the model using the term “The Singularity 
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Effect.” When activated in the model, it induces a nonlinear decrease of manned systems 
with an equal but opposite increase in unmanned systems intended to reach parity by 
2035.137 
D. AIR FORCE PILOT MANNING MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This research involved creating a simplified system dynamics model of the USAF 
pilot population with both “Manned Pilot Stock: and “Unmanned Pilot Stock.” Other stocks 
used in the model are the “USAFA/ROTC,” the “Total USAF Manning,” and “Pilot 
Training.” Pilot Candidates flow out of the USAFA/ROTC stock and flow into the Pilot 
Training stock. The Total USAF Manning stock represents that portion of the Air Force 
population not currently serving as pilots. Of note, Annual Lat Transfers to Manned Pilot 
Candidates flow out of the Total USAF Manning stock and into the Pilot Training stock. 
Circular converters represent various values that contribute directly or indirectly to the rate 
equations of each inflow and outflow (depicted as valves).  
The model was structured in this way for several reasons. First, manned and 
unmanned platforms share pilots during times of critical manning shortages and increased 
operational tempos.138 Second, unmanned and autonomous platforms’ long-term strategic 
effects will increase over time while manned platforms will decrease.139 This prediction is 
captured by a “The Singularity Effect” converter and is discussed further in the Data 
Analysis section of this paper.  
According to a recent GAO report, the Air Force does not track the overall progress 
of accessing and retaining its remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots to meet deployment 
goals.140 Moreover, pilots move from the manned aircraft community to the unmanned 
aircraft community and vice-versa at varying rates, which have not been closely managed 
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over the last ten years.141 This research’s simplified system dynamics model attempts to 
capture this flow between the stocks with estimates based on the manned and unmanned 
training dropout rates. In 2018, the Air Force commissioned RAND to conduct a study on 
the feasibility of allowing enlisted members into the pilot corps. The study recommended 
the Air Force adjust policy, allowing limited, infrequent pilot accessions from among the 
enlisted population and lateral transfers from other services, starting in 2021. The system 
dynamics model shown in Figure 3 incorporates these policy options. 
The Air Force initially built the unmanned career field using manned pilots before 
establishing the RPA specialty. Approximately 42 percent of remotely piloted aircraft are 
currently flown by pilots qualified for manned aircraft and temporarily assigned to fly 
unmanned aircraft. On the other hand, about 17 percent of manned aircraft pilots came 
from the RPA community.142 This imbalance in manned versus unmanned aircraft pilots 
was an essential element of the research design for this model. The model moves pilots 
between unmanned and manned platforms. It illustrates how the Air Force may prepare for 
the gradual decrease of manned platform utilization and the alternative increase of 
unmanned platforms. A U.S Department of Transportation report with research by the 
Volpe Center predicts that unmanned missions will exceed manned missions by 2035.143 
Using this prediction as a guide, the model simulates manned and unmanned parity as the 
Air Force moves to 21,000 pilots over the next ten years. The model is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2.  Air Force Manned-Unmanned Pilot System 
E. MODEL OUTCOMES 
In the three years since the Air Force Secretary’s 2018 call to grow the force by 74 
flying units,144 the Air Force has not achieved any meaningful change with its current 
policies.145 The few retention policy changes, such as a $35,000 increase in the aviation 
bonus and variable extension options for pilots, were not enough to stop 200 pilots from 
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leaving the service in the last two years. Even though manning figures for 2021 have not 
yet been collected, the model shows a total inflow of 9 percent of the total pilot stock, with 
a total outflow of 12.5 percent, a 3.5 percent net outflow in 2021. This outflow includes a 
nearly stable 8.78 percent loss rate after considering dropouts from the manned and 
unmanned pilot training pipelines. It is used for the duration of the model’s run in Strategic 
Approach 1. The Air Force Manned-Unmanned Pilot System model was run to evaluate 
three different strategic approaches to achieving the desired pilot manning end-strength, as 
cited in the research question. These three strategic approaches are discussed below.  
a. Strategic Approach 1 
The first strategic approach implemented in the model aims to mirror current 
accessions, retention, and transfers between communities. These options most closely 
resembled the current state of the existing USAF pilot manning system. Therefore, the 
Unemployment Effect converter was enabled. In contrast, “The Singularity Effect” 
converter that introduced a speculative nonlinear decrease in manned aircraft use matched 
by an equal but opposite increase in unmanned aircraft use over time was not selected in 
Strategic Approach 1. 
The first strategic approach for the Air Force analyzed with the system dynamics 
model is to implement a policy that directly affects the retention rate. Based on 
unemployment rate predictions, and despite high AvB, other compensation measures must 
be considered to incentivize pilots to continue their service. For example, offering more 
flexible service extensions associated with incentive pays and better assignment selection. 
This recommendation to target the retention rate directly with incentives is supported by 
the 2016 RAND study that showed significantly increased airline salaries were strongly 
correlated to an Air Force pilot’s decision to stay or leave the service.146 The Air Force 
can do this by offering more flexible term limits associated with lucrative aviation incentive 
pays (AvIP), and aviation bonus (AvB) incentive pays, better assignment selection, and 
possibly decreased operational tempo. Based on unemployment rate predictions and 
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despite high AvB, other compensation measures must be considered to incentivize pilots 
to continue their service. Additionally, exit interviews conducted in Taylor’s “Air Force 
Pilot Shortage” study showed that most pilots who separated before they were retirement-
eligible did so because of higher salaries and a diminishing amount of time spent in the 
cockpit due to increased administrative duties.147 
Since the Air Force implemented AvIP and the AvB, it has significantly increased 
the costs of maintaining a more senior force. Still, it has found a simple way of increasing 
its pilots’ experience. According to a 2019 RAND study in which unmanned pilots are 
excluded entirely, AvB increased pilot retention and ultimately human capital over an 
expanded accession pipeline. The pilot force is more experienced and senior at an average 
AvB of $100,00. Moreover, the per-pilot training cost decreases when the overall AvB cost 
is nonlinear, yielding a reduced cost per capita when the total AvB is higher and a higher 
cost per capita when the AvB is lower. Currently, the Air Force does not have enough data 
to draw a significant correlation between the AvB and the retention rate, so it prefers to 
examine retention related to commercial airline hiring rates.148 Figure 3 shows the options 
selected in the dashboard, which most closely represent the system’s current state as 
modeled. 
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Figure 3. Strategic Approach 1 
b. Strategic Approach 2 
The second strategic approach introduces increased unmanned aircraft use into the 
system and raises the Unmanned Pilot Selection rate from the Pilot Training Stock to 30 
percent. This approach has two benefits: it addresses the short-term RPA platform attrition 
rate and continues the Air Force’s RPA community development priorities.149 In this 
approach, the Pilot Training capacity must be expanded to 1,700 trainees per year. 
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Additionally, this approach requires the transfer of pilots from the Unmanned Pilot Stock 
to the Manned Pilot Stock to be reduced to zero. Further, it requires a 10 percent increase 
in manned pilot transfers to the unmanned community with an 18 percent increase in 
enlisted and inter-service transfers to the Manned Pilot Stock per year. If all of the above 
policy changes were implemented, the modeling suggests the Air Force could close the 
manning gap by 2032. The dashboard controls are shown in Figure 4. Note the scale change 
on the x-axis in the Active Pilots graph on the left. Although the service does not reach the 
manning goal by the expiry date, this approach was intended to evaluate the minimum 
policy actions the Air Force must take to reach 21,000 pilots without pursuing other 
wartime, non-steady-state options that were beyond the scope of this research. Figure 4 





Figure 4. Strategic Approach 2 
c. Strategic Approach 3 
The final approach effectively shifted the Air Force’s pilot manning from its current 
negative balance to the demand required by the NDS deadline. If the Air Force can increase 
Pilot Training capacity to 1,750 and decrease their pilot loss rates to 5 percent through a 
combination of increased AvIP and AvB and various other compensatory policies, the 
simulation showed the service could reach 20,500 pilots by 2030. The 5 percent loss rate 
may seem like an unreachable policy goal; however, it is essential to remember the Navy 
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reached this rate in 2013.150 Only by decreasing the reliance on manned aircraft can the 
Air Force achieve parity between the manned and unmanned platforms and reach its stated 
goal of 21,000 pilots by 2030. The selected dashboard options and resulting charts are 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Strategic Approach 3 
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V. FINDINGS 
In the Strategic Approach 1 model, which reflects the current Air Force Manned-
Unmanned Pilot System, the Air Force adds pilots to its force at a rate of 2 percent per year 
and loses just over 8 percent on average per year. With a 2 percent inflow and an 8 percent 
outflow, the Air Force will continue to lose pilots over time. As constructed, the Pilot 
Training stock has a capacity of 1,300 students per year. Any attempt to increase the inflow 
rates into the Manned Pilot Stock or the Unmanned Pilot Stock was constrained by this 
capacity limit in the Pilot Training stock. Since the service has shown an inability to reduce 
the loss rate, the Air Force should increase capacity at the initial pilot training school in 
addition to increasing incentive pay. The first strategic approach most closely represents 
the current policies to solve the pilot manning problem. This constraint suggests that the 
Air Force may be reluctant to increase pilot training accessions through inter-service or 
enlisted transfers if that would result in fewer opportunities for USAFA and ROTC 
candidates.  
The first strategic approach indicated a good fit of the model’s structure with actual 
performance graphs of the Air Force’s current policy options concerning accessions, 
transfers, and loss rates. The model mirrors the current pilot manning levels in manned and 
unmanned communities when these options are selected and run. The model indicated these 
options could reduce the shortfall but could not wholly eliminate it. Further, these options 
suggest that the pilot manning shortages will likely continue with only minor fluctuations 
if the Air Force takes no other action.  
In the Strategic Approach 2 model, the Air Force Manned-Unmanned Pilot System 
exhibits a shift in loop dominance that results in S-shaped growth as the Manned and 
Unmanned Pilot Socks move toward parity by 2035. The Pilot Training capacity in 
Strategic Approach 2 was increased to 1,700 per year. Lateral transfers from other services 
or the USAF enlisted communities into Pilot Training were 299 per year. Finally, transfers 
from the Manned Pilot Stock to the Unmanned Pilot Stock were increased to 10 percent of 
the Unmanned Pilot Stock annually. As a result, the inflow of pilots was increased from 
1,300 per year to 1,550 per year after initialization. The Manned and Unmanned Pilot 
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stocks grew to 8,280 and 8,480 respectively by 2033. After which, the Manned Pilot Stock 
increased to 10,000, while the Unmanned Pilot Stock gradually decreased to 7,710 by 2048. 
In the dashboard, the Manned Pilot Selection Rate and Unmanned Pilot Selection Rate 
simulated a policy directive to send 69.9 percent of the candidates to the Manned Pilot 
Stock and the remaining 29.1 percent to the Unmanned Pilot Stock. Total Air Force 
manning increased to 365,000 by 2030 and continued to grow to 416,000 by 2049. 
Additionally, manned pilot separations increased during the first five years to 1,000 per 
year but gradually declined to 578 per year in 2039.  
Additionally, there has been no change to the current 8.78 percent loss rate after 
factoring in training dropouts. According to the model, despite all current policy options, 
the Air Force will fall short of meeting the demand for 21,000 pilots by 2030 (Figure 5-
graph). However, if the Air Force could increase the training pipeline to 1,700 candidates 
per year and decrease the loss rate through various policy options to 5 percent by 
incorporating the manned/unmanned parity of technological growth over time, the model 
suggests the Air Force could potentially reach its pilot manning goal by 2030.  
The options selected in Strategic Approach 3 represented the most extreme policy 
options. In addition to those described in the second strategic approach, Strategic Approach 
3 modeled an evenly split, 50 percent -50 percent selection rate for the Manned Pilot Stock 
and the Unmanned Pilot Stock. Additionally, the annual Pilot Training Stock’s capacity 
was increased to 1,750 candidates per year and enlisted, and inter-service transfers were 
raised to 348 annually. With these options selected, the Manned Pilot Stock decreases only 
slightly from 10,900 at initialization to 10,200 by 2030. The Unmanned Pilot Stock, 
however, increases rapidly from 1,900 at initialization to 10,910 by 2030. These figures 
bring the combined totals in the Manned Pilot Stock and the Unmanned Pilot Stock to the 
Air Force’s desired end strength goal by the expiry date. After 2030, both stocks continue 
to increase slightly every year until reaching 11,500 and 13,100 in the Manned Pilot Stock 
and Unmanned Pilot Stock, respectively, by 2048. Total Air Force manning increased to 
375,000 by 2030 and continued to grow to 446,000 by 2049. 
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VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This exploratory research reviewed previous academic work in human capital 
management in the context of military force structure, the current strategic environment, 
and recent technological and cultural trends that impact military human resource 
management. Warfare-centric human capital management was examined from a strategic 
design perspective to explore the potential value of understanding and employing human 
resources and technology more effectively in the military. System dynamics concepts and 
modeling were used to analyze strategic human capital management approaches the USAF 
might pursue to address the chronic problem of pilot manning as a generalizable use case 
for all services. Specifically, system dynamics modeling was used to answer the research 
question: How can the Air Force achieve an end strength of 21,000 pilots by 2030?  
Based on previous research covered in the Literature Review and analysis of the 
system dynamics modeling, this research resulted in the following recommended actions 
the Air Force might consider to reach the desired pilot end strength by 2030: 
• Increase the number of pilot candidates who annually enter the IFT to 1,750 
trainees from 1,300.  
• Work to achieve parity between manned and unmanned platforms in the next 
10 to 15 years. 
• Identify and implement more flexible personnel actions for service length 
requirements, assignment selections, and incentive pays. 
• Increase pilot-related education programs and educational opportunities for all 
service members. 
The military use case of human capital management is only one part of a much 
larger system, requiring continued examination of military force structures and the 
population that supports them. Manning shortfalls create undue stress on personnel within 
the system and drive incentive pays and term commitments higher and longer. As a 
practical use case, the modeling served to understand better the behavior of the Air Force 
50 
pilot manning system over a prescribed period. Future research in this area should include 
examining the policy recommendations listed in this conclusion and their applicability to 
human capital management in other services based on the dynamics and demands of the 
current and foreseeable strategic environment. 
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